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Abstract This article shows how the endogenous human capital affects the
labor market equilibrium when jobs provided by firms can be either unskilled
or skilled and workers differ in their education level which can be either low-
educated or high-educated. We develop an equilibrium search model in which
the high-educated workers are assumed to be able to accept either the un-
skilled jobs or the skilled jobs, while the low-educated workers can only accept
the unskilled jobs. The market equilibrium is characterized by deriving the
unemployment rate and the human capital distributions when the growth rate
of the human capital is an endogenous variable. The results demonstrate that
the structure proportion of the offered jobs affects the equilibrium which shows
there is a threshold that can distinguish whether the equilibrium is separat-
ing or cross-skill. In addition, the cross-skill equilibrium solution implies the
high-educated workers are more likely to own higher pay rates than the low-
educated workers with same tenure. It also yields a new insight on the effect
of the structure proportion of workers on the profits, which implies the profits
of the firms decrease with the increasing number of the low-educated workers.
Moreover, the profit of the firms offering the skilled jobs is greater than those
offering the unskilled jobs until there is only very few high-educated workers.
Keywords Job search · Labor market equilibrium · Contracts · Human
capital accumulation · Education level
1 Introduction
The talents, which have high level of education, are the most precious fortune
and resources of an enterprise. Moreover, they are the direct motivities of
economic development and social advancement. However, anti-intellectualism,
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which is defined as “opposing or hostile to intellectuals or to an intellectual
view or approach”, may be generally found in many countries in recent years.
It has some negative influences on the development of higher education and
socioeconomic. In addition, it will make people lose the passion in education
development and affect the promotion of social civilization. The effect of en-
dogenous changes of human capital on the market equilibrium is one of the
urgent problems in the studies of labor market. It is therefore crucial to de-
velop effective job search strategies and market equilibrium analysis for the
problem.
The unsymmetrical distribution between job opportunities and labor re-
sources makes the real labor market different from other markets. In the labor
market, workers of different education levels hope to find suitable jobs within
the shortest time, while firms of different production levels expect to maxi-
mize their benefits through offering workers the wage as low as possible. Search
theory has been an important theory in the labor market which is full of uncer-
tainty and information completeness. Since the pioneering research of Stigler
(1961, 1962), many researchers have done tremendously significant works in
the search theory. McCall (1965, 1970) developed a sequential search model to
analyze the job search behaviors of the new entrants. Given that the searcher
is assumed to know both the distribution of wages for particular skills and the
cost of generating a job offer, the optimal stopping rule for the job searcher
is to reject all the offers below a single reservation wage. Phelps et al (1971)
who is the first one to propose the concept of job search theory assumed that
firms offer diversity wages. Each worker has incomplete information about
the distribution of wages and learns about it from her search outcomes. In
the early work on job search, most simple models did not consider on-the-job
search, analyzed equilibrium in the steady-state condition, and assumed the
distribution of wage is given exogenously, and leisure have no value, etc. But
more recently, job search models relax the assumptions of the canonical model
by allowing workers can be heterogeneous, an endogenous wage distribution,
on-the-job search and unsteady-state conditions, to have better explanations
for the search behaviors of workers, the process of the firms offering wage, and
the phenomenon of job creation and job destruction in the labor market.
Over the past a few decades, there has been a number of significant devel-
opments in the study of labor market equilibrium. Maybe the most commonly
used equilibrium search models are on the basis of the work of Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) (for simplicity B/M). B/M assumed that each firm posts
a single wage, both employed and unemployed workers can search for bet-
ter job opportunities. They found that the unique equilibrium distribution
of wage offers is non-degenerate, even if firms and workers are homogeneous.
However, an obvious weakness of the simplest B/M model is that wage of
worker will not increase unless changing employer. Having recognized that,
Burdett and Coles (2003) (for simplicity B/C) and Stevens (2004) extended
B/M by assuming that firms post wage-tenure contract rather than a sin-
gle wage. Burdett and Coles (2010b) generalized previous work by assuming
firms have different productivities. More productive firms always offer more
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desirable wage-tenure contracts and a worker who quits to a more productive
firm may accept a wage cut. Carrillo-Tudela (2009b) studied the labor mar-
ket equilibrium in which firms offer wage-experience contracts on the basis
of B/M. Carrillo-Tudela (2009a) subsequently made an important assumption
that firms cannot decide their wage offers on unemployment and employment
duration. Shi (2009) analyzed the equilibrium in a labor market in which firms
offer wage-tenure contracts to direct the search by risk-averse workers. From
the aspects of contract form, this paper differs from the aforementioned papers
in the important aspect that the firms offer wage-human capital contracts in
order to analyze the effects of human capital accumulation on the labor market
equilibrium.
Recent years, a number of theses have combined human capital accumula-
tion to the B/M as studied here. For instance, Rubinstein and Weiss (2007)
analyzed the accumulation of human capital and on-the-job search, however,
not considering market equilibrium. The model structured by Robin et al
(2011) is a useful tool to study labor markets as they structured a model on a
panel of Danish matched employer-employee data to analyze the determinants
of individual wage dynamics. Dolado et al (2008) who examined the effects of
transitory skill mismatches in a matching model with heterogeneous jobs and
workers. Gonzalez and Shi (2010) integrated learning from search into an equi-
librium framework and applied lattice-theoretic techniques to analyze learning
from experience. In an insightful study, Burdett and Coles (2010a) assumed
that workers accumulate general human capital through learning-by-dong, and
they found the equilibrium approach to identify the effects between experience
and tenure on workers’ wages. Bring in training, Fu (2011) yielded new insights
on wage dispersion and wage dynamics which shows that endogenous training
breaks the perfect correlation between work experience and human capital.
The model addressed in this thesis is related to the work of Burdett et al
(2011). Burdett et al (2011) structured an equilibrium labor market by al-
lowing workers learn by doing. Their paper implied that learning-by-doing
increases equilibrium wage dispersion and considered that all firms are equally
productive, and workers are heterogeneous defined by initial productivity. In
contrast to the previous discussion, we discuss an equilibrium search model
in which firms offer unskilled jobs or skilled jobs with different distribution
and workers with low-education or high-education search for better job op-
portunities. The introduction of heterogeneous firms refines the structure of
the Labor market which has important consequences for the optimal search
profits. High-educated workers are assumed to accept unskilled jobs for which
they are over-qualified. The structure proportion of jobs effects the equilib-
rium which shows there is a threshold that can distinguish whether exists a
separating equilibrium or a cross-skill equilibrium. In addition, the cross-skill
equilibrium solution implies that the high-educated workers are more likely to
own higher pay rates than that the low-educated workers with the same tenure
are likely to. It also implies both the profits of offering the unskilled jobs and
offering skilled jobs decrease with the increasing number of the low-educated
workers. Moreover, the profit of the firms offering the skilled jobs is greater
4 Chaoqun Xiao et al.
than the profit of the firms offering the unskilled jobs until there is only very
few high-educated workers. Another important difference is that we allow for
the growth rate of an employed worker’s human capital to be an endogenous
variable. Unlike other papers such as Burdett and Coles (2010a), Carrillo-
Tudela (2010), Burdett et al (2011) and Fu (2011) in which the growth rate
of an employed worker’s productivity is given exogenously, this allows us to
clarify the endogenous growth rate of human capital which can be determined
by death shock, job destruction shock, the fraction of the unskilled jobs and
the arrival rate of jobs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a framework
describing the workers’ job search strategies with different education level and
the firms’ optimal contract. Section 3 gives a definition of market equilibrium
and illustrates the distributions of pay rate in different types of jobs. Section
4 presents the effect of human capital accumulation on equilibrium pay rate.
Using numerical example, Section 5 describes how the proportion of the low-
educated workers effect profit and the support of the pay rate. The paper is
concluded in Section 6 with further work pointed out.
2 The model
Consider a labor market in steady state in which time is discrete. There is a
continuum of risk neutral workers and firms, each of measure one.
The workers differ in their education level j which can be either low-
educated (j = 0) or high-educated (j = 1). An exogenous fraction α ∈ [0, 1]
of the workers is low-educated, while the remaining fraction 1 − α is high-
educated. After a low-educated worker has worked for τ periods up to period
t, and her human capital is denoted by ht = (1+ g)τ , where 0 < g < 1. While
for a high-educated worker, her human capital ht = egτ . For each new entrant,
τ = 0 and ht = 1. The lives of workers are of uncertain duration. Any worker
dies with probability δ per period and δ also describes the inflow rate of new
entrants per period. All the dead workers are replaced with newly joined work-
ers, so the population is balanced. There are job destruction shocks in which
each employed worker is displaced into unemployment with probability σ per
period. Assuming that there is no recall if a worker quit or reject a job offer.
The object of a worker is to maximize her total expected lifetime utility.
Jobs are either unskilled or skilled. A fraction β of all the jobs in the labor
market which can be performed by both types of workers are called unskilled
jobs; while 1 − β of all the jobs which only requires high-educated workers
are called skilled jobs. Any firm generates revenue p from each unit of human
capital he employs. Each firm posts a job offer contract θi at zero cost on a
“take it or leave it” basis in the period t, where θi is the pay rate per unit of
human capital and i specifies the type of jobs, which can be either unskilled
jobs (i = 0) or skilled jobs (i = 1). Let F0(θ0) describe the probability of
receiving an unskilled job offer which is no greater than θ0. Likewise, F1(θ1)
describes the probability of receiving a skilled job offer which is no greater than
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θ1. Further, let θi and θ
i
denote the infimum and supremum of the support of
Fi. Let λ denote the Poisson arrival rate of these offers. Low-educated workers
meet these offers at the same rate as high-educated do, but they do not qualify
for the skilled jobs. The effective arrival rate of unskilled job offers faced by
any low-educated worker is βλ, independent of their employment status; while
for high-educated workers, the effective arrival rate depends on the type of
jobs. If a job is from unskilled jobs, the arrival rate is βλ; if it is from skilled
jobs, the offer arrival rate is (1−β)λ. For simplicity, we assume that firms only
offer one type of job and the choice is irreversible. The object of each firm is
thus to maximize steady state flow profit.
Assume that workers and firms meet randomly. For a low-educated worker
with human capital ht, she will meet an outside firm which offers unskilled
job contract θ0 with probability βλ. If the match succeeds, the worker is paid
θ0ht while the firm’s profit is
(
p− θ0)ht at the production stage. Meanwhile
for a high-educated worker with human capital ht, it depends on the type of
the outside jobs. With probability βλ the worker will meet an unskilled jobs
offering θ0. Then the worker is paid θ0ht and the firm’s profit is
(
p− θ0)ht at
the production stage. With probability (1−β)λ the worker will meet a skilled
job offering θ1. If the match succeeds, the worker is paid θ1ht and the firm’s
profit is
(
p− θ1)ht. If the match does not succeed, the worker returns to her
previous status. In this situation, the outside firm doesn’t have any profit.
For an unemployed worker, she has income bht, where b can be interpreted as
home production or leisure, and 0 < b < p.
2.1 Worker behavior
When a job arrivals, a worker must choose between keeping the current status
or accepting an outside offer. Let xt be the worker’s decision variable which
can be either 0 or 1, in which xt = 0 means that the worker will keep the
current status, while xt = 1 means that the worker will accept the new offer.
2.1.1 Low-educated workers’ payoffs and job search strategies
In this section, the search behavior of only low-educated workers is considered.
The low-educated workers’ objective function is
max
xt
E
∞∑
t=0
u (θt, ht, xt) ,
where θt, ht are the state variables in t period.
First consider the unemployed workers with low-education. The pay rate
θt of the workers satisfies
θt+1 = ξ
{
(1− ζ)b+ ζ [(1− xt)b+ xtθ0]} ,
where ξ is a random variable denoting whether a low-educated worker dies at
that period with Pr{ξ = 0} = δ which means the worker dies and Pr{ξ =
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1} = 1 − δ which means the worker is still in the labor market. While ζ is
also a random variable, denoting whether a low-educated worker receives an
unskilled job with Pr{ζt = 1} = βλ and Pr{ζ = 0} = 1− βλ. In addition, the
human capital of the unemployed worker does not grow. The expected lifetime
utility of an unemployed worker with the human capital ht is indicated by
Vu0(ht). When an unemployed worker with low-education meets an outside
job offering θ0, she would compare the expected lifetime utility of accepting
the offer, denoted by V0(θ0;ht), with that of unemployment Vu0(ht). If the
worker chooses V0(θ0;ht), it means that she accepts a new offer θ0. Otherwise,
she still keeps the current status. Therefore, the Bellman equation
Vu0(ht) = max{bht + E(θ0)V0(θt+1;ht+1)},
which can be rewritten as follows
Vu0(ht) = bht + (1− δ − βλ)Vu0(ht) + βλE(θ0)max{Vu0(ht), V0(θ0;ht)}.
(1)
Next consider the employed workers with low-education. Different from the
unemployed workers, there is a job destruction shock for the employed workers
with low-education. The pay rate θt of the employed worker with low-education
satisfies
θt+1 = ξ
{
(1− η)b+ η [(1− ζ)θt + ζ ((1− xt)θt + xtθ0)]} ,
where η is a random variable denoting whether there exists a job destruction
shock with Pr{η = 0} = σ which means the worker is displaced into unemploy-
ment and Pr{η = 1} = 1 − σ which means there is no job destruction shock,
and independent with ξ and ζ. Let V0(θt;ht) denote the expected lifetime util-
ity of a worker whose human capital is ht and employed by a firm offering
θt in period t. Given an employed worker with human capital ht, she needs
to choose the larger one between V0(θt;ht+1) and V0(θ0;ht+1). In addition,
her human capital ht will be (1 + g)ht next period. Therefore, the Bellman
equation
V0(θt;ht) = max{θtht + E(θ0)V0(θt+1;ht+1)},
which can be written as
V0(θt;ht) =θtht + σVu0((1 + g)ht) + (1− δ − σ − βλ)V0(θt; (1 + g)ht)
+βλE(θ0)max{V0(θt; (1 + g)ht), V0(θ0; (1 + g)ht)}. (2)
The employed worker has a job from which she gets θt for each unit of her hu-
man capital in period t, which corresponds to the first term on the right-hand
side in Eq.(2). With probability σ, the worker is displaced into unemployment
by a job destruction shock, which is the second term on the right-hand side
in Eq.(2). If the worker does not receives any offer, she keeps with the current
firm, which is the third term on the right-hand side in Eq.(2). Next period the
worker gets a new offer with probability βλ, upon which she chooses whether
to stay with the current job or to accept the new job, which is the last term
on the right-hand side in Eq.(2).
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The employed worker with low-education leaves the firm when she dies or
is displaced into unemployment or receives an outside offer which is higher
than her current offer. Hence, the separate probability
ψ0(θt) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θt)),
which describes the separation rate of a low-education worker employed by a
firm offering θt.
Employed workers would accept any outsider offer which is higher than her
current offer; while for unemployed worker, they would accept any outsider
offer which is no less than the reservation pay rate described in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 For the unemployed workers with low-education, the reserva-
tion pay rate per unit of human capital, denoted by θ0r , can be characterized by
the following equation
δ(b(1 + g)− θ0r)
g
= b+ βλ
∫ θ0
θ0r
1− F0(θ)
1− (1 + g) (1− ψ0(θ))dθ. (3)
Moreover, the optimal job search implies that any unemployed worker with
low-education accepts job offer θ0 if and only if θ0 ≥ θ0r .
Proof It is obvious that a worker’s income, whether the worker is unemployed
or employed, is always proportional to ht, that is, there exists a number vu0
and a function v0(θt) such that Vu0(ht) = vu0ht and V0(θt;ht) = v0(θt)ht
respectively. In this way, Eq.(1) can be written as
δvu0 = b+ βλ
∫ θ0
θ0r
(v0(θ)− vu0)dF0(θ), (4)
while Eq.(2) can be written as
v0(θt) = θt + (1 + g)
[
σvu0 + (1− δ − σ)v0(θt) + βλ
∫ θ0
θt
(v0(θ)− v0(θt))dF0(θ)
]
.(5)
Since θ0r is the reservation pay rate per unit of human capital of the unem-
ployed workers with low-education, there is no difference between accepting
the offer θ0r and keeping unemployment, i.e., V0(θ
0
r ;ht) = Vu0(ht). Therefore,
we get v0(θ0r) = vu0. Let θt = θ
0
r in Eq.(5). Thus,
vu0 = θ0r + (1 + g)
[
(1− δ)vu0 + βλ
∫ θ0
θ0r
(v0(θ)− vu0)dF0(θ)
]
. (6)
Note that
∫ θ0
θ0r
(v0(θ)) − vu0)dF0(θ) = δvu0 − b
βλ
by (4), and then (6) can be
written as
gvu0 = b(1 + g)− θ0r . (7)
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On the other hand, differentiating (5) with respect to θt yields
dv0(θt)
dθt
=
1
1− (1 + g) (1− ψ0(θt)) . (8)
Therefore, (4) can be written as
δvu0= b+ βλ
∫ θ0
θ0r
(v0(θ)− vu0)dF0(θ)
= b+ βλ
[∫ θ0
θ0r
(1− F0(θ))dv0(θ)dθ dθ
]
(integrate by parts)
= b+ βλ
∫ θ0
θ0r
1− F0(θ)
1− (1 + g)(1− ψ0(θ))dθ (by(8))
(9)
Substituting (7) into (9) yields Eq.(3). Moreover, the optimal job search implies
that any unemployed worker with low-education accepts job offer θ0 if and only
if θ0 ≥ θ0r . This completes the proof.
Proposition 2 The growth rate of human capital g is an endogenous variable
which is increasing with the death shock δ and the job destruction shock σ,
while decreasing with the fraction of the unskilled jobs β and the arrival rate
of jobs λ.
Proof Calculating the derivative of Eq.(3) with θ0r , so as to get
F0(θ0r) = 1−
δ[1− (1 + g)(1− δ − σ)]
βλ(g − δ − gδ) . (10)
All the unskilled jobs offer θ0 ≥ θ0r , θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ
0
], otherwise there is no worker
accepts the offer. Thus in the market equilibrium, F0(θ0r) = 0, and from Eq.(10)
we can get
g =
δ(δ + σ + βλ)
(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ . (11)
Therefore, g is determined by δ, σ, β and λ. It is easily to prove that the
partial derivatives of g have the following properties:
∂g
∂δ
=
(βλ+ δ)2 + σβλ
[(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ]2 > 0,
∂g
∂σ
=
(βλ+ δ)δ
[(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ]2 > 0,
∂g
∂β
=
−δλσ
[(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ]2 < 0,
∂g
∂λ
=
−δβσ
[(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ]2 < 0.
As a result, g is increasing with δ and σ, decreasing with β and λ. This
completes the proof.
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Facing the high death rate or the staff reduction in large, workers normally
raise the growth rate of the human capital actively which increases production
indirectly in order to continue to be employed. That is why the rise of the
death shock or the job destruction shock result in the growth rate of the
human capital increases. If there are more unskilled jobs in the labor market,
resulting in demotivation, the growth rate of the human capital reduces. When
the situation of employment is better, such as the arrival rate of the jobs is
higher, the workers obviously have less competition which leads to the growth
rate of the human capital becomes slower.
Proposition 3 The reservation pay rate of unemployed workers with low-
education θ0r which satisfies Eq.(3) is unique.
Proof From Eq.(3), we can get
θ0r = −
gβλ
δ
∫ θ0
θ0r
1− F0(θ)
1− (1 + g) (1− ψ0(θ))dθ −
gb
δ
+ (1 + g)b.
Let
T (x) = −gβλ
δ
∫ θ0
x
1− F0(θ)
1− (1 + g) (1− ψ0(θ))dθ −
gb
δ
+ (1 + g)b.
∀x1, x2 ∈ [θ0, θ0],
|T (x1)− T (x2)| =
∣∣∣∣gβλδ
∫ x2
x1
1− F0(θ)
1− (1 + g) (1− δ − σ − βλ(1− F0(θ)))dθ
∣∣∣∣ .
∃² ∈ [x1, x2] ∈ (θ0, θ0),
|T (x1)− T (x2)|= gβλ
δ
∣∣∣∣ (x2 − x1)(1− F0(²))1− (1 + g)(1− δ − σ − βλ(1− F0(²)))
∣∣∣∣
.
Since
g =
δ(δ + σ + βλ)
(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ ,
it is easily to find that
0 <
gβλ(1− F0(²))
δ [1− (1 + g)(1− δ − σ − βλ(1− F0(²)))] < 1.
So that
|T (x1)− T (x2)| < |x2 − x1| .
From Banach fixed point theorem, we can prove that there exists a unique
point θ0r ∈ [θ0, θ
0
] satisfying Eq.(3).
Obviously, the term on the left-hand side of Eq.(3) is linear in θ0r with slope
− δg , and the straight line intercepts the x-axis at θr0 = b(1 + g). The terms on
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the right-hand side of Eq.(3) describe a curve which is continuous and strictly
decreasing with first derivative
− βλ[1− F0(θ
0
r)]
[1− (1 + g) (1− ψ0(θ0r))]
= − δ
g
< 0,
that means the straight line is tangent to the curve at θ0r . It is clear that the
terms on the right-hand side are positive strictly. Therefore, the straight line
and the curve must have a unique intersection at some θ0r < b(1+g) described
in Figure 1 which implies θ0r is unique. This completes the proof.
Fig. 1 Reservation pay rate of unemployed workers with low-education
2.1.2 High-educated workers’ payoffs and job search strategies
For the high-educated workers, they can receive both the unskilled jobs and
the skilled jobs, and their objective function is
max
xt
E
∞∑
t=0
u (θt, ht, xt) ,
where θt and ht are the state variables in period t.
First consider the unemployed workers with high-education. The pay rate
θt of the workers satisfies
θt+1 = ξ
{
(1− y)b+ y [(1− xt)b+ xt ((1− z)(θ0 + c) + zθ1)]} ,
where ξ, η, ζ, y and z are all independent radon variables. ξ, η and ζ are
described as the same as the above section, y denotes whether the unemployed
worker with high-education receives an outsider offer with Pr{y = 0} = 1− λ
means that the worker does not receive any outside job and Pr{y = 1} = λ
which means that the worker receives an outside offer, and z represents the
kind of the outsider offer received with Pr{z = 0} = βλ which means the offer
is from the unskilled jobs and Pr{z = 1} = (1− β)λ which means the offer is
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from the skilled jobs. y and z are independent with ξ, η and ζ. In addition, the
human capital of the unemployed worker with high-education does not grow.
The Bellman equation
Vu1(ht) = max{bht + E(θ0)V1(θt+1;ht+1)},
which can be rewritten as follows
Vu1(ht) =bht + (1− δ − λ)Vu1(ht) + βλE(θ0)max{Vu1(ht), V1(θ0;ht)}
+(1− β)λE(θ1)max{Vu1(ht), V1(θ1;ht)}. (12)
Next consider the employed workers with high-education. The worker’s pay
rate θt satisfies
θt+1 = ξ
{
(1− η)b+ η [(1− y)θt + y ((1− xt)θt + xt ((1− z)θ0 + zθ1))]} .
Given an employed worker with the human capital ht and the pay rate θt in
t period, the Bellman equation
V1(θt;ht) = max{θtht + E(θ1)V1(θt+1;ht+1)},
which can be written as
V1(θt;ht) = θtht + σVu1(eght) + (1− δ − σ − λ)V1(θt; eght)
+βλE(θ0)max{V1(θt; eght), V1(θ0 + c; eght)}
+(1− β)λE(θ1)max{V1(θt; eght), V1(θ1; eght)}.
(13)
The employed worker leaves the firm when she dies or is displaced into
unemployment or receives an outside offer which is higher than her current
offer. Given the pay rate θt, the employed worker leaves a firm at the rate
ψ1(θt) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θt)) + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θt)),
which is the separation rate of an employed worker with high-education. Sim-
ilarly, the employed worker with high-education accepts any outsider offer
which is higher than her current offer, while the unemployed worker with
high-education accepts any outsider offer which is no less than the reservation
pay rate described in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 For the unemployed workers with high-education, the reserva-
tion pay rate per unit of human capital, denoted by θ1r , can be described by the
following equation
δ
(
egb− θ1r
)
eg − 1 = b+ λ
[∫ θ0
θ1r
β (1− F0(θ))
1− eg (1− ψ1(θ))dθ +
∫ θ1
θ1r
(1− β) (1− F1(θ))
1− eg (1− ψ1(θ)) dθ
]
.
(14)
Furthermore, the optimal job search implies that an unemployed worker with
high-education accepts job offer θ1 if and only if θ1 ≥ θ1r .
12 Chaoqun Xiao et al.
Proof It is obvious that a worker’s income is always proportional to ht, that
is, there exists a number vu1 and a function v1(θt) such that Vu1(ht) = vu1ht
and V1(θt;ht) = v1(θt)ht respectively. In this way, Eq.(12) implies that vu1
satisfies
δvu1 = b+ λ
[
β
∫ θ0
θ1r
(v1(θ)− vu1)dF0(θ) + (1− β)
∫ θ1
θ1r
(v1(θ)− vu1)dF1(θ)
]
,(15)
while Eq.(13) implies that v1(θt) satisfies
v1(θt) =θt + σvu1 + eg[(1− δ − σ)v1(θt) + βλ
∫ θ0
θt
(v1(θ)− v1(θt))dF0(θ)
+(1− β)λ
∫ θ1
θt
(v1(θ)− v1(θt))dF1(θ)].
(16)
Since θ1r is the reservation pay rate per unit of human capital of the unem-
ployed workers with high-education, there is no difference between accepting
the offer θ1r and keeping unemployment, i.e., V1(θ
1
r ;ht) = Vu0(ht). Therefore,
we can get v1(θ1r) = vu1. Thus,
vu1 =θt + eg
[
(1− δ)vu1 + βλ
∫ θ0
θt
(v1(θ)− vu1)dF0(θ)
+ (1− β)λ
∫ θ1
θt
(v1(θ)− vu1)dF1(θ)
]
.
(17)
Let θt = θ1r in (17). That is
vu1 =θ1r + e
g[(1− δ)vu1 + βλ
∫ θ0
θ1r
(v1(θ)− vu1)dF0(θ)
+(1− β)λ
∫ θ1
θ1r
(v1(θ)− vu1)dF1(θ)].
(18)
Note that β
∫ θ0
θ1r
(v1(θ)−vu1)dF0(θ)+(1−β)
∫ θ1
θ1r
(v1(θ)−vu1)dF1(θ) = δvu1 − b
λ
by (15), thus (18) can be written as
(eg − 1)vu1 = egb− θ1r . (19)
On the other hand, differentiating (16) with respect to θt implies v1(θt) is
determined by the following differential equation
dv1(θt)
dθt
=
1
1− eg (1− ψ1(θt)) . (20)
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Therefore, (15) can be written as
δvu1= b+ λ
[
β
∫ θ0
θ1r
(v1(θ)− vu1)dF0(θ) + (1− β)
∫ θ1
θ1r
(v1(θ)− vu1)dF1(θ)
]
= b+ λ
[
β
∫ θ0
θ1r
(1− F0(θ))dv0(θ)dθ dθ + (1− β)
∫ θ1
θ1r
(1− F1(θ))dv0(θ)dθ dθ
]
(integrate by parts)
= b+ λ
[
β
∫ θ0
θ1r
1− F0(θ)
1− eg (1− ψ1(θ))dθ + (1− β)
∫ θ1
θ1r
1− F1(θ)
1− eg (1− ψ1(θ))dθ
]
(by(20))
(21)
Substituting (19) into (21) yields Eq.(14). Moreover, the optimal job search
implies that any unemployed worker with high-education accepts job offer θ1
if and only if θ1 ≥ θ1r . This completes the proof.
Proposition 5 When the fraction of the unskilled jobs is greater than β, there
exists a cross-skill equilibrium that is the high-educated workers choose either
the unskilled job or the skilled job; when the fraction of the unskilled jobs is no
greater than β, there exists a separating equilibrium that is the high-educated
workers only choose the skilled jobs, where β satisfies
exp
(
δ(δ + σ + βλ)
(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ
)
=
(1− β)λ+ δ
(1− δ)[(1− β)λ+ δ]− δσ .
Proof Calculating the derivative of Eq.(14) with θ1r , so as to get
βF0(θ1r) + (1− β)F1(θ1r) = 1−
δ[1− eg(1− δ − σ)]
λ(eg − 1− δeg) . (22)
All the skilled jobs offer θ1 ≥ θ1r , θ1 ∈ [θ1, θ
1
], otherwise there is no worker
accepts the offer. Thus in the market equilibrium, F1(θ1r) = 0, and Eq.(22)
can be written as
F0(θ1r) =
1
β
− δ[1− e
g(1− δ − σ)]
βλ(eg − 1− δeg) . (23)
For the unskilled jobs, if θ
0 ≥ θ1r which means that the high-educated workers
choose either the unskilled job or the skilled job, we can get F0(θ1r) < 1, and
by Eq.(23), there exists
eg <
(1− β)λ+ δ
[(1− β)λ+ δ](1− δ)− δσ .
Since
g =
δ(δ + σ + βλ)
(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ ,
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it is easily to get
exp
(
δ(δ + σ + βλ)
(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ
)
<
(1− β)λ+ δ
[(1− β)λ+ δ](1− δ)− δσ .
Therefore, when the fraction of the unskilled jobs is greater than β, the high-
educated workers choose either the unskilled job or the skilled job.
If θ
0
< θ1r which implies that the high-educated workers only choose the
skilled jobs, we can get F0(θ1r) = 1, and by Eq.(23), there exists
eg =
(1− β)λ+ δ
[(1− β)λ+ δ](1− δ)− δσ .
Since
g =
δ(δ + σ + βλ)
(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ ,
it is easily to get
exp
(
δ(δ + σ + βλ)
(βλ+ δ)(1− δ)− δσ
)
=
(1− β)λ+ δ
[(1− β)λ+ δ](1− δ)− δσ . (24)
When the fraction of the unskilled jobs is no greater than β, the high-educated
workers only choose the skilled jobs. This completes the proof.
Proposition 6 The reservation pay rate of the unemployed workers with high-
education θ1r which satisfies Eq.(14) is unique.
Proof From Eq.(14), we can get
θ1r =e
gb− (e
g − 1)b
δ
− (e
g − 1)λ
δ
[∫ θ0
θ1r
β (1− F0(θ))
1− eg (1− ψ1(θ))dθ
+
∫ θ1
θ1r
(1− β) (1− F1(θ))
1− eg (1− ψ1(θ)) dθ
]
.
(25)
Let
T (x) = egb− (e
g − 1)b
δ
− (e
g − 1)λ
δ
[∫ θ0
x
β (1− F0(θ))
1− eg (1− ψ1(θ))dθ
+
∫ θ1
x
(1− β) (1− F1(θ))
1− eg (1− ψ1(θ)) dθ
]
.
(26)
∀x1, x2 ∈ [θ0, θ0],
|T (x1)− T (x2)| =
∣∣∣∣ (eg − 1)λδ
[∫ x2
x1
1− βF0(θ)− (1− β)F1(θ)
1− eg(1− ψ1(θ)) dθ
]∣∣∣∣
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∃² ∈ [x1, x2] ∈ (θ0, θ0),
|T (x1)− T (x2)|= (e
g − 1)λ
δ
∫ x2
x1
1− βF0(θ)− (1− β)F1(θ)
1− eg [1− δ − σ − λ+ βF0(θ) + (1− β)F1(θ)]dθ
=
∣∣∣∣ (eg − 1)λδ
[
(x2 − x1)1− βF0(²)− (1− β)F1(²)1− eg(1− ψ1(²))
]∣∣∣∣
<
(eg − 1)λ
δ[1− eg(1− δ − σ − λ)] |x2 − x1| .
It is easily to find that 0 <
(1− σ)(eg − 1)λ
δ[1− eg(1− δ − σ − λ)] < 1. From Banach fixed
point theorem, we can prove that there exists a unique point θ1r ∈ [θ0, θ
0
]
satisfied Eq.(14).
Obviously, the term on the left-hand side of Eq.(14) is linear in θ1r with
slope − δ
eg − 1 and the straight line intercepts the x-axis at θ
r
1 = e
gb. The
terms on the right-hand side of Eq.(14) describe a curve which is continuous
and strictly decreasing with the first derivative
−λ[1− βF0(θ
1
r)− (1− β)F1(θ1r)]
1− eg (1− ψ1(θ1r))
= − δ
eg − 1 < 0,
which means the straight line is tangent to the curve at θ1r . It is clear that
the terms on the right-hand side are positive strictly. Therefore, the straight
and the curve must have a unique intersection at some θ1r < e
gb described in
Figure 5 which shows that θ1r is unique. This completes the proof.
Fig. 2 Reservation pay rate of unemployed workers with high-education
2.2 Firm’s payoffs
The firm’s optimization problem can reduce to choosing an optimal pay rate
to maximize the steady state profit. Let Nj(h) denote the probability of the
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unemployed workers of type j whose human capital is h, Gj(θ, h) denote the
probability of employed workers with human capital h and pay rate θ, and γj
denote the unemployment rate of the workers with type j, j = 0, 1.
For a firm offering unskilled job contract θ0 to the low-educated workers
with human capital (1 + g)τ , the steady state profit
pi00= αλαγ0
∞∑
τ=0
[
N0 ((1 + g)τ )
∞∑
s=0
(1− ψ0(θ0))s(p− θ0)(1 + g)s+τ
]
+αλα(1− γ0)
∞∑
τ=0
[∫ θ0
θ0
G0(θ, (1 + g)τ )dθ
∞∑
s=0
(1− ψ0(θ0))s(p− θ0)(1 + g)s+τ
]
=
λα2(p− θ0)
1− (1− ψ0(θ0))(1 + g)
[
γ0
∞∑
τ=0
N0 ((1 + g)τ ) (1 + g)τ
+ (1− γ0)
∞∑
τ=0
∫ θ0
θ0
G0(θ, (1 + g)τ )(1 + g)τdθ
]
.
(27)
The steady state flow profit equals the hiring rate of the firm, multiplied by the
expected profit of each hire. The first term in the above equation is the flow
profit due to attracting unemployed workers with low-education whose human
capital is (1+g)τ , where τ is the experience. The second term is the flow profit
due to attracting employed workers with low-education whose human capital
is (1 + g)τ and her current offer is no greater than θ0.
If the firm offering unskilled job contract θ0 to the high-educated workers
with human capital egτ , the steady state profit
pi01= (1− α)λ(1− α)γ1
∞∑
τ=0
[
N1 (egτ )
∞∑
s=0
(1− ψ1(θ0))s(p− θ0)eg(s+τ)
]
+(1− α)λ(1− α)(1− γ1)
∞∑
τ=0
[∫ θ0
θ1
G1(θ, egτ )dθ
∞∑
s=0
(1− ψ1(θ0))s(p− θ0 − c)eg(s+τ)
]
=
λ(1− α)2(p− θ0 − c)
1− (1− ψ1(θ0))eg
[
γ1
∞∑
τ=0
N1 (egτ ) egτ + (1− γ1)
∞∑
τ=0
∫ θ0
θ1
G1(θ, egτ )egτdθ
]
.
(28)
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The firm offering unskilled jobs can attract both types of workers, thus the
optimization problem can be described as follows:
max
θ0
(pi00 + pi01)
s.t.

V0(θt;ht) =θtht + (1 + g) [σVu0(ht) + (1− δ − σ)V0(θt;ht)
+βλ
∫ θ0
θt
(V0(θ0;ht)− V0(θt;ht))dF0(θ0)
]
δVu0(ht) =bht + βλ
∫ θ0
θ0r
(V0(θ0;ht)− Vu0(ht))dF0(θ0)
V1(θt;ht) =θtht + eg [σVu1(ht) + (1− δ − σ)V1(θt;ht)
+ βλ
∫ θ0
θt
(V1(θ0;ht)− V1(θt;ht))dF0(θ0)
+(1− β)λ
∫ θ1
θt
(V1(θ1;ht)− V1(θt;ht))dF1(θ1)
]
δVu1(ht) =bht + λ
[
β
∫ θ0
θ1r
(V1(θ0;ht)− Vu1(ht))dF0(θ0)
+(1− β)
∫ θ1
θ1r
(V1(θ1;ht)− Vu1(ht))dF1(θ1)
]
.
(29)
If a firm offering a skilled job contract θ1 to the high-educated workers
with human capital egτ , the steady state profit
pi11= λ(1− α)γ1
∞∑
τ=0
[
N1 (egτ )
∞∑
s=0
(1− ψ1(θ1))s(p− θ1)eg(s+τ)
]
+λ(1− α)(1− γ1)
∞∑
τ=0
[∫ θ1
θ1
G1(θ, egτ )dθ
∞∑
s=0
(1− ψ1(θ1))s(p− θ1)eg(s+τ)
]
=
λ(1− α)(p− θ1)
1− (1− ψ1(θ1))eg
[
γ1
∞∑
τ=0
N1 (egτ ) egτ + (1− γ1)
∞∑
τ=0
∫ θ1
θ1
G1(θ, egτ )egτdθ
]
.
(30)
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The firm offering skilled jobs only attracts high-educated workers, then the
optimization problem can be described as follows:
max
θ1
pi11
s.t.

V1(θt;ht) =θtht + eg [σVu1(ht) + (1− δ − σ)V1(θt;ht)
+ βλ
∫ θ0
θt
(V1(θ0;ht)− V1(θt;ht))dF0(θ0)
+(1− β)λ
∫ θ1
θt
(V1(θ1;ht)− V1(θt;ht))dF1(θ1)
]
δVu1(ht) =bht + λ
[
β
∫ θ0
θ1r
(V1(θ0;ht)− Vu1(ht))dF0(θ0)
+(1− β)
∫ θ1
θ1r
(V1(θ1;ht)− Vu1(ht))dF1(θ1)
]
(31)
Note that the object of each firm is to maximize steady state flow profit, that
is, the unskilled firms choose θ0 to maximize pi0 = pi00 + pi01, while the skilled
firms choose θ1 to maximize pi1 = pi11. Moreover, let pi∗i denote the optimal
value satisfying the above restrain condition, i = 0, 1.
3 Market equilibrium
We now formally define a market equilibrium.
Definition 1 Amarket equilibrium is a set {θ0r , θ1r , γ0, γ1, N0(·), N1(·), G0(·), G1(·), F0(·),
F1(·)} that satisfies the following requirements:
1) θ0r is the optimal reservation pay rate per unit of human capital of any
unemployed low-educated worker, and θ1r is the optimal reservation pay
rate per unit of human capital of any unemployed high-educated worker,
given in Propositions 1 and 4, respectively;
2) γ0, N0(·), G0(·) are consistent with the steady state turnover and pay rate
distribution F0(·); likewise, γ1, N1(·), G1(·) are consistent with steady state
turnover and pay rate distributions F0(·) and F1(·);
3) the constant profit conditions are satisfied, i.e.,
pi00 + pi01 = pi∗0 > 0, for all θ
0 where dF0(θ0) > 0,
pi00 + pi01 ≤ pi∗0 , for all θ0 where dF0(θ0) = 0,
pi11 = pi∗1 > 0, for all θ
1 where dF0(θ1) > 0 or dF1(θ1) > 0,
pi11 ≤ pi∗1 , for all θ1 where dF0(θ1) = 0 and dF1(θ1) = 0,
where pi00 is the profit of the firms offering the unskilled jobs to the low-
educated workers, pi01 is the profit of the firms offering the unskilled jobs to
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the high-educated workers, pi11 is the profit of the firms offering the skilled
jobs to the high-educated workers, pi∗0 is the total optimal profit of offering
the unskilled jobs and pi∗1 is the total optimal profit of the firms offering the
skilled jobs in a equilibrium market. The constant profit conditions imply
that all equilibrium offers of the same type i enjoy the same profit pi∗i with
the workers’ optimal strategy.
In Section 3.1, we firstly use the steady state turnover arguments to solve for
γj , j = 0, 1. And then in Section 3.2, we determine the distribution functions
Nj(·) and Gj(·). Lastly, we find Fi in Section 3.3 so that the above constant
profit conditions are satisfied, i = 0, 1.
3.1 Solve γ0, N0(·) and G0(·) for the low-educated workers
To solve γ0, we first consider the steady state turnover in the pool of un-
employed workers whose number is γ0α. The total outflow from this pool is
(βλ+ δ)γ0α, which either finds a job or leaves the market. While the inflow in
the pool is composed of the new entrants and the employed workers who are
displaced into the unemployment, which is δα+σ(1−γ0)α. Equating the out-
flow with the inflow, the equilibrium unemployment rate of the low-educated
workers is
γ0 =
σ + δ
δ + σ + βλ
. (32)
To solve N0(h), we next consider the steady state turnover in the pool
of the unemployed workers with human capital h. When h = 1, the outflow
(βλ + δ)γ0αN0(1) consists of the workers who either find an unskilled job or
leave the market. And the inflow is composed only of the new entrants which is
δα, as the human capital of the workers who are laid off from the employment
is at least (1 + g). Setting the outflow equal to the inflow yields
N0(1)=
δ
γ0(βλ+ δ)
. (33)
When h ∈ {(1 + g)m}∞m=1, the steady-state turnover requires
(βλ+ δ)γ0αN0(h) = σ(1− γ0)α
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, h)dθ, (34)
where the left hand side describes the outflow of the workers with human
capital h who find a new unskilled job or leave the labor market, and the right
hand side describes the inflow of the employed workers with human capital h
and current offer θ who are displaced into the unemployment. Solving for (34)
yields
N0(h)=
σ(1− γ0)
(βλ+ δ)γ0
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, h)dθ. (35)
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Therefore,
N0(h) =

δ
γ0(βλ+ δ)
, if h = 1
σ(1− γ0)
(βλ+ δ)γ0
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, h)dθ, if h ∈ {(1 + g)m}∞m=1.
To solve G0(θ, h), we finally consider the steady state turnover in the pool
of the employed workers with human capital h, where h ∈ {(1+ g)m}∞m=1 and
her current pay rate θ is no greater than θ0. The workers with human capital
h will leave this pool for sure regardless of whether they stay (if they stay,
their human capital becomes (1+ g)h) or are displaced into unemployment or
leave the market, so the total outflow is
(1− γ0)α
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, h)dθ.
The workers with human capital (1+g)−1h who were employed or unemployed
will join this pool group if they find a job offering pay rate which is no greater
than θ0. The inflow of these workers is
(1− γ0)α
[
1− ψ0(θ0)
] ∫ θ0
θ0r
G0
(
θ,
h
1 + g
)
dθ + γ0αN0 (h)βλF0(θ0).
Equating the outflow with the inflow implies
(1− γ0)
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, h)dθ =(1− γ0)
[
1− ψ0(θ0)
] ∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ,
h
1 + g
)dθ
+γ0N0 (h)βλF0(θ0).
(36)
Proposition 7 For the low-educated workers, the steady state turnover in a
market equilibrium implies
N0(h) =
δσβλ
γ0(βλ+ δ)2
qm0 ,
and G0(θ, h) satisfies∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, h)dθ =
δβλF0(θ0)(βλ+ δ − βλσ)
(1− γ0)(βλ+ δ) [σ(1− ψ0(θ0)) + (1− F0(θ0))(βλ+ δ)]
×
{
(1− F0(θ0))
[
1− ψ0(θ0)
]m + σ
βλ+ δ
qm+10
}
,
for all θ0 ∈ [θ0r , θ
0
] and h ∈ {(1 + g)m}∞m=0, where q0 = (1−δ−σ)(βλ+δ)βλ(1−σ)+δ < 1.
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Proof Let h = 1 and θ0 = θ
0
in (36). Thus,∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, 1)dθ =
γ0βλ
1− γ0N0(1),
and using (33) to substitute out N0(1) obtains∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, 1)dθ =
δβλ
(1− γ0)(βλ+ δ) .
Let h ∈ {(1 + g)m}∞m=1 and θ0 = θ
0
in (36) once again. Therefore,
(1− γ0)
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, (1 + g)m)dθ =(1− γ0)
[
1− ψ0(θ0)
] ∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, (1 + g)m−1)dθ
+γ0N0 ((1 + g)m)βλ,
and using (35) to substitute out N0(·) yields∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, (1 + g)m)dθ = q0
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, (1 + g)m−1)dθ,
where
q0 =
(1− δ − σ)(βλ+ δ)
βλ+ δ − σβλ < 1.
Therefore, when h ∈ {(1 + g)m}∞m=0,∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, (1 + g)m)dθ =
δβλ
(1− γ0)(βλ+ δ)q
m
0 . (37)
Using (37) in (35) obtains
N0((1 + g)m) =
δσβλ
γ0(βλ+ δ)2
qm0 . (38)
Given θ0, if h = 1, (36) can be written as∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, 1)dθ =
δβλF0(θ0)
(1− γ0)(βλ+ δ) ,
and if h ∈ {(1 + g)m}∞m=1, (36) can be written as∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, (1 + g)m)dθ =
[
1− ψ0(θ0)
] ∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, (1 + g)m−1)dθ +
σδβ2λ2F0(θ0)
(1− γ0)(βλ+ δ)2 q
m
0 .
Then we can get that G0(θ, h) satisfies∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, h)dθ =
δβλF0(θ0)(βλ+ δ − λσ)
(1− γ0)(βλ+ δ) [σ(1− ψ0(θ0)) + (1− F0(θ0))(βλ+ δ)]
×
{
(1− F0(θ0))
[
1− ψ0(θ0)
]m + σ
βλ+ δ
qm+10
}
.
(39)
This completes the proof.
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3.2 Solve γ1, N1(·) and G1(·) for the high-educated workers
The inflow and the outflow of the high-educated workers is similar to the
low-educated workers.
To solve γ1, we first consider the steady state turnover in the pool of the
unemployed workers with high-education whose number is γ1(1−α). Equating
the outflow (δ + λ)γ1(1− α) with the inflow δ(1− α) + σ(1− γ1)(1− α), the
equilibrium unemployment rate of the high-educated workers is
γ1 =
δ + σ
δ + σ + λ
. (40)
To solve N1(h), we next consider the steady state turnover in the pool
of the unemployed workers with human capital h. When h = 1, the outflow
(δ + λ)γ1(1− α)N1(1) consists of the workers who leave the market or either
find an unskilled job or a skilled job. And the inflow is composed only of the
new entrants which is δ(1−α). Setting the outflow equal to the inflow implies
that N1(1) satisfies
N1(1) =
δ
γ1(δ + λ)
. (41)
When h = {eng}∞n=1, the steady state turnover requires
(δ + λ)γ1(1− α)N1(eng) = σ(1− γ1)(1− α)
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, eng)dθ, (42)
where the left hand side describes the outflow of unemployed workers with
human capital h who find a new job or leave the labor market, and the right
hand side describes the inflow of employed workers with human capital eng
who are displaced into unemployment. Solving for N1(eng) implies
N1(eng)=
σ(1− γ1)
(δ + λ)γ1
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, eng)dθ. (43)
Therefore,
N1(h) =

δ
γ1(δ + λ)
, if h = 1
σ(1− γ1)
(δ + λ)γ1
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, eng)dθ, if h ∈ {eng}∞n=1.
To solve G1(h), we finally consider the steady state turnover in the pool
of the employed workers with human capital h where h ∈ {eng}∞n=1 and her
current pay rate θ is no greater than θ1. The workers with human capital h
will leave this pool for sure regardless of whether they stay (if they stay, their
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human capital become egh) or are displaced into unemployment or leave the
market, so the total outflow is
(1− γ1)(1− α)
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, h)dθ.
The workers with human capital e−gh who were employed or unemployed will
join this pool group if they find a job offering pay rate which is no greater
than θ1. The inflow of these workers is
(1− γ1)(1− α)
(
1− ψ1(θ1)
) ∫ θ1
θ1r
G1
(
θ,
h
eg
)
dθ
+γ1(1− α)N1 (h)λ
(
βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1)
)
.
Equating the outflow with the inflow yields
(1− γ1)
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, h)dθ =(1− γ1)
(
1− ψ1(θ1)
) ∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ,
h
eg
)dθ
+γ1N1(h)λ
(
βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1)
)
.
(44)
Proposition 8 For the high-educated workers, the steady state turnover in a
market equilibrium implies:
N1(eng) =
δσλ
γ1 (λ+ δ)
2 q
n
1 ,
and G1(h) satisfies∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, eng)dθ =
δλ(βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1))(λ+ δ − σλ)
(1− γ1)(δ + λ) [σ(1− ψ1(θ1)) + (1− βF0(θ1)− (1− β)F1(θ1))(λ+ δ)]
×
[(
1− βF0(θ1)− (1− β)F1(θ1)
)
(1− ψ1(θ1))n + σ
γ + δ
qn+11
]
,
for all θ ∈ [θ1r , θ
1
] and h ∈ {eng}∞n=1, where q1 =
(1− δ − σ)(λ+ δ)
λ+ δ − σλ < 1.
Proof Use the same method like the above subsection to consider the high-
educated workers. Let h = 1 and θ1 = θ
1
in (44). Thus,
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, 1)dθ =
γ1λ
(1− γ1)N1(1),
and using (41) to substitute out N1(1) yields∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, 1)dθ =
δλ
(1− γ1)(λ+ δ) .
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Let h ∈ {eng}∞n=1 and θ1 = θ
1
in (44). Hence,
(1− γ1)
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, eng)dθ = (1− γ1)
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, e(n−1)g)
(
1− ψ1(θ1)
)
dθ + γ1λN1(eng).
and using (43) to substitute out N1(.) yields
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, eng)dθ = q1
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, e(n−1)g)dθ,
where
q1 =
(1− δ − σ)(λ+ δ)
λ+ δ − σλ < 1.
Therefore, when h ∈ {eng}∞n=1,∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, eng)dθ =
δλ
(1− γ1)(λ+ δ)q
n
1 . (45)
Using (45) in (43) implies
N1(eng) =
δσλ
γ1 (λ+ δ)
2 q
n
1 . (46)
Given θ1, if h = 1, (44) can be written as,∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, 1)dθ =
δλ
(
βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1)
)
(1− γ1)(λ+ δ) ,
and if h ∈ {eng}∞n=1, (44) can be written as,∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, eng)dθ =
(
1− ψ1(θ1)
) ∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, e(n−1)g)dθ +
σδλ2[βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1)]
(1− γ1)(λ+ δ)2 q
n
1 .
Then we can get that G1(θ, h) satisfies∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, eng)dθ =
δλ(βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1))(λ+ δ − σλ)
(1− γ1)(δ + λ) [σ(1− ψ1(θ1)) + (1− βF0(θ1)− (1− β)F1(θ1))(λ+ δ)]
×
[(
1− βF0(θ1)− (1− β)F1(θ1)
)
(1− ψ1(θ1))n + σ
γ + δ
qn+11
]
.
(47)
This completes the proof.
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3.3 Solve F0(θ0) and F1(θ1)
Using (38) and (39) to substitute out N0((1 + g)τ ) and
∫ θ0
θ0
G0(θ, (1 + g)τ )dθ
in (27), pi00 can be written as
pi00(θ0) =
βλ2α2(p− θ0)δ
[1− (1− ψ0(θ0))(1 + g)] (βλ+ δ) [σ(1− ψ0(θ0)) + (1− F0(θ0))(βλ+ δ)]
×
[
σ(βλ+ δ + σ)(1− σ − δF0(θ0))
[1− q0(1 + g)](βλ+ δ) +
(βλ+ δ − βλσ)F0(θ0)(1− F0(θ0))
1− (1− ψ0(θ0))(1 + g)
]
,
where
ψ0(θ0) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ0)).
Moreover, substitute N1(egτ ) and
∫ θ0
θ1
G1(θ, egτ )dθ into (28) to get the fol-
lowing formula
pi01(θ0) =
λ2(1− α)2(p− θ0)δ
[1− (1− ψ1(θ0))eg] (λ+ δ) [σ(1− ψ1(θ0)) + (1− βF0(θ0)− (1− β)F1(θ0)))(λ+ δ)]
×
[
σ(λ+ δ + σ)
[
1− σ − δ(βF0(θ0) + (1− β)F1(θ0))
]
(1− q1eg)(λ+ δ)
+
(λ+ δ − σλ)(βF0(θ0) + (1− β)F1(θ0))(1− βF0(θ0)− (1− β)F1(θ0))
1− (1− ψ1(θ0))eg
]
,
where
ψ1(θ0) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ0)) + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ0)).
Note that pi0(θ0) = pi00(θ0)+pi01(θ0) for all θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ0]. By the constant profit
conditions, we have pi0(θ0) = pi∗0 for all θ
0 ∈ [θ0, θ0]. To obtain the equilibrium
profit for the firms offering unskilled jobs pi∗0 , set θ
0 = θ0, we can obtain
pi∗0 =
βλ2α2δσ(p− θ0)
[1− (1− δ − σ − βλ)(1 + g)](βλ+ δ)2[1− q0(1 + g)]
+
λ2(1− α)2δσ(p− θ0)
[1− (1− δ − σ − λ)eg](λ+ δ)2(1− q1eg) .
(48)
To solve for F0(·) and F1(·), we divide [θ0, θ0] into two intervals [θ0, θ1] and
(θ1, θ
0
]. In interval [θ0, θ1], there are only the unskilled jobs, while in interval
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(θ1, θ
0
], there are both the unskilled jobs and the skilled jobs. And then we
should determine θ1. Assume that θ0 = θ1,
pi0(θ1) =
βλ2α2(p− θ1)δ[
1− (1− ψ0(θ1))(1 + g)
]
(βλ+ δ)
[
σ(1− ψ0(θ1)) + (1− F0(θ1))(βλ+ δ)
]
×
[
σ(βλ+ δ + σ)(1− σ − δF0(θ1))
[1− q0(1 + g)](βλ+ δ) +
(βλ+ δ − βλσ)F0(θ1)(1− F0(θ1))
1− (1− ψ0(θ1))(1 + g)
]
+
λ2(1− α)2(p− θ1)δ[
1− (1− ψ1(θ1))eg
]
(λ+ δ)
[
σ(1− ψ1(θ1)) + (1− βF0(θ1)))(λ+ δ)
]
×
[
σ(λ+ δ + σ)(1− σ − δβF0(θ1))
(1− q1eg)(λ+ δ) +
(λ+ δ − σλ)βF0(θ1)(1− βF0(θ1))
1− (1− ψ1(θ1))eg
]
,
(49)
where
ψ0(θ1) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ1)),
ψ1(θ1) = δ + σ + λ− βλF0(θ1),
and
F0(θ1) =
1
β
− δ[1− e
g(1− δ − σ)]
βλ(eg − 1− δeg) .
As pi0(θ1) = pi∗0 , we can determine θ
1. When θ0 ∈ [θ0, θ1],
pi0(θ0) =
βλ2α2(p− θ0)δ
[1− (1− ψ0(θ0))(1 + g)] (βλ+ δ) [σ(1− ψ0(θ0)) + (1− F0(θ0))(βλ+ δ)]
×
[
σ(βλ+ δ + σ)(1− σ − δF0(θ0))
[1− q0(1 + g)](βλ+ δ) +
(βλ+ δ − βλσ)F0(θ0)(1− F0(θ0))
1− (1− ψ0(θ0))(1 + g)
]
+
λ2(1− α)2(p− θ0)δ
[1− (1− ψ1(θ0))eg] (λ+ δ) [σ(1− ψ1(θ0)) + (1− βF0(θ0)))(λ+ δ)]
×
[
σ(λ+ δ + σ)(1− σ − δβF0(θ0))
(1− q1eg)(λ+ δ) +
(λ+ δ − σλ)βF0(θ0)(1− βF0(θ0))
1− (1− ψ1(θ0))eg
]
,
(50)
where
ψ0(θ0) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ0)),
and
ψ1(θ0) = δ + σ + λ− βλF0(θ0).
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Thus we can get the expression for F0(θ0) by Eqs. (48) and (50), where θ0 ∈
[θ0, θ1]. When θ0 ∈ (θ1, θ0],
pi0(θ0) =
βλ2α2(p− θ0)δ
[1− (1− ψ0(θ0))(1 + g)] (βλ+ δ) [σ(1− ψ0(θ0)) + (1− F0(θ0))(βλ+ δ)]
×
[
σ(βλ+ δ + σ)(1− σ − δF0(θ0))
[1− q0(1 + g)](βλ+ δ) +
(βλ+ δ − βλσ)F0(θ0)(1− F0(θ0))
1− (1− ψ0(θ0))(1 + g)
]
+
λ2(1− α)2(p− θ0)δ
[1− (1− ψ1(θ0))eg] (λ+ δ) [σ(1− ψ1(θ0)) + (1− βF0(θ0)− (1− β)F1(θ0)))(λ+ δ)]
×
[
σ(λ+ δ + σ)
[
1− σ − δ(βF0(θ0) + (1− β)F1(θ0))
]
(1− q1eg)(λ+ δ)
+
(λ+ δ − σλ)(βF0(θ0) + (1− β)F1(θ0))(1− βF0(θ0)− (1− β)F1(θ0))
1− (1− ψ1(θ0))eg
]
,
(51)
where
ψ0(θ0) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ0)),
and
ψ1(θ0) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ0)) + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ0)).
Setting θ0 = θ
0
yields
pi0(θ
0
) =
βλ2α2(p− θ0)δ(βλ+ δ + σ)
[1− (1− δ + σ)(1 + g)] (βλ+ δ)2[1− q0(1 + g)]
+
λ2(1− α)2(p− θ0)δ[
1− (1− ψ1(θ0))eg
]
(λ+ δ)
[
σ(1− ψ1(θ0)) + (1− β)(1− F1(θ0))(λ+ δ)
]
×
σ(λ+ δ + σ)
[
1− σ − δ(β + (1− β)F1(θ0))
]
(1− q1eg)(λ+ δ)
+
(λ+ δ − σλ)(β + (1− β)F1(θ0))(1− β)(1− F1(θ0))
1− (1− ψ1(θ0))eg
]
,
(52)
where
ψ1(θ
0
) = δ + σ + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ0)).
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Using (46) and (47) to substitute outN1(egτ ) and
∫ θ1
θ1
G1(θ, egτ )dθ in (30),
we can get the following formula
pi11(θ1) =
λ2(1− α)(p− θ1)δ
[1− (1− ψ1(θ1))eg] (λ+ δ) [σ(1− ψ1(θ1)) + (1− βF0(θ1)− (1− β)F1(θ1)))(λ+ δ)]
×
[
σ(λ+ δ + σ)
[
1− σ − δ(βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1))
]
(1− q1eg)(λ+ δ)
+
(λ+ δ − σλ)(βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1))(1− βF0(θ1)− (1− β)F1(θ1))
1− (1− ψ1(θ1))eg
]
,
where
ψ1(θ1) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ1)) + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ1)).
Note that pi1(θ1) = pi11(θ1) for all θ1 ∈ [θ1, θ1]. By the constant profit con-
ditions, we have pi1(θ1) = pi∗1 for all θ
1 ∈ [θ1, θ1]. To obtain the equilibrium
profit for the firms offering skilled jobs, set θ1 = θ1, we obtain
pi∗1 =
λ2(1− α)(p− θ1)δ[
1− (1− ψ1(θ1))eg
]
(λ+ δ)
[
σ(1− ψ1(θ1)) + (1− βF0(θ1)))(λ+ δ)
]
×
[
σ(λ+ δ + σ)(1− σ − δβF0(θ1))
(1− q1eg)(λ+ δ) +
(λ+ δ − σλ)βF0(θ1)(1− βF0(θ1))
1− (1− ψ1(θ1))eg
]
,
(53)
where
ψ0(θ1) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ1)),
and
F0(θ1) =
1
β
− δ[1− e
g(1− δ − σ)]
βλ(eg − 1− δeg) .
Given θ1 = θ
1
,
pi1(θ
1
) =
λ2(1− α)(p− θ1)δ(λ+ δ + σ)
[1− (1− δ − σ)eg](δ + λ)2(1− q1eg) .
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As pi1(θ
1
) = pi∗1 , we can obtain θ
1
. Divide θ1 ∈ [θ1, θ1] into two intervals [θ1, θ0]
and (θ
0
, θ
1
], and then we should determine θ
0
. Setting θ1 = θ
0
yields
pi1(θ
0
) =
λ2(1− α)(p− θ0)δ[
1− (1− ψ1(θ0))eg
]
(λ+ δ)
[
σ(1− ψ1(θ0)) + (1− β)(1− F1(θ0))(λ+ δ)
]
×
σ(λ+ δ + σ)
[
1− σ − δ(β + (1− β)F1(θ0))
]
(1− q1eg)(λ+ δ)
+
(λ+ δ − σλ)(β + (1− β)F1(θ0))(1− β)(1− F1(θ0))
1− (1− ψ1(θ0))eg
]
,
(54)
where
ψ1(θ
0
) = δ + σ + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ0)).
We can get the expressions for θ
0
and F1(θ
0
), as Eqs. (52) and (54) are two
equations about θ
0
and F1(θ
0
). When θ1 ∈ [θ1, θ0], there exists
pi1(θ1) =
λ2(1− α)(p− θ1)δ
[1− (1− ψ1(θ1))eg] (λ+ δ) [σ(1− ψ1(θ1)) + (1− βF0(θ1)− (1− β)F1(θ1)))(λ+ δ)]
×
[
σ(λ+ δ + σ)
[
1− σ − δ(βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1))
]
(1− q1eg)(λ+ δ)
+
(λ+ δ − σλ)(βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1))(1− βF0(θ1)− (1− β)F1(θ1))
1− (1− ψ1(θ1))eg
]
,
(55)
where
ψ1(θ0) = δ + σ + βλ(1− F0(θ0)) + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ0)).
We obtain the expression for F0(θ1) and F1(θ1) by Eqs. (48), (51), (53) and
(55), when θ1 ∈ [θ1, θ0]. Moreover, when θ1 ∈ (θ0, θ1],
pi1(θ1) =
λ2(1− α)(p− θ1)δ
[1− (1− ψ1(θ1))eg] (λ+ δ) [σ(1− ψ1(θ1)) + (1− β)(1− F1(θ1))(λ+ δ)]
×
[
σ(λ+ δ + σ)
[
1− σ − δ(β + (1− β)F1(θ1))
]
(1− q1eg)(λ+ δ)
+
(λ+ δ − σλ)(β + (1− β)F1(θ1))(1− β)(1− F1(θ1))
1− (1− ψ1(θ1))eg
]
,
(56)
where
ψ1(θ1) = δ + σ + (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ1)).
We can get the expression for F1(θ1) by Eqs. (53) and (56), when θ1 ∈ (θ0, θ1].
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4 Human capital and equilibrium pay rate
In this section, we first research the effect of the low-educated workers’ hu-
man capital on equilibrium pay rate. Next, we consider the effect of the high-
educated workers’ human capital on the equilibrium pay rate. Similar to the
findings of Burdett et al. Burdett et al (2011), there is positive correlation
between the human capital of workers and the equilibrium pay rates. Last, we
discuss differences between these two kinds of effects.
4.1 The effect of low-educated workers’ human capital on equilibrium pay
rate
Denote
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ|h)dθ =
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, h)dθ∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ, h)dθ
, which implies the probability of the
low-educated workers’ pay rate is less than θ0 conditional on human capital
h = (1 + g)m. Using (39) can obtain that
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ|h)dθ = (βλ+ δ − βλσ)F0(θ
0)
σ(1− ψ0(θ0)) + (βλ+ δ)(1− F0(θ0))
{
(1− F0(θ0))
(
1− ψ0(θ0)
q0
)m
+
σ(1− δ − σ)
βλ+ δ − βλσ
}
.
(57)
Notice that (βλ+δ−βλσ)F0(θ
0)
σ(1−ψ0(θ0))+(βλ+δ)(1−F0(θ0)) > 0, 1−F0(θ0) > 0 and
σ(1−δ−σ)
βλ+δ−βλσ > 0.
Since 0 < 1 − ψ0(θ0) < 1 and 0 < q0 < 1, we can get 1−ψ0(θ
0)
q0
> 0. On the
other hand, 1−ψ0(θ
0)
q0
= [
1−δ−σ−βλ(1−F0(θ0))](βλ+δ−βλσ)
(1−δ−σ)(βλ+δ) < 1, therefore, 0 <
1−ψ0(θ0)
q0
< 1. Thus, it can prove that the conditional probability is decreasing
in m. That is to say, a low-educated worker with higher human capital is more
likely to have a higher pay rate.
Specially, when m = 0, Eq.(57) can be written as
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ|1)dθ = F0(θ0).
It shows that for the new entrants with low-educated, their pay rates are
randomly drawn from F0(θ0). Further, when m→∞,
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ|∞)dθ = σ(1− δ − σ)F0(θ
0)
σ(1− ψ0(θ0)) + (βλ+ δ)(1− F0(θ0)) ,
which implies that
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ|∞)dθ is non-degenerate.
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Proposition 9 The probability of the low-educated workers’ equilibrium pay
rate which is less than θ0 conditional on human capital h,
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ|h)dθ, is
decreasing in h.
4.2 The effect of high-educated workers’ human capital on equilibrium pay
rate
Note that
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ|h)dθ =
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, h)dθ/
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ, h)dθ, which implies
the probability of the high-educated workers’ pay rate is less than θ1 condition
on human capital h. Using (47) obtains that
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ|h)dθ = (λ+ δ − σλ)(βF0(θ
1) + (1− β)F1(θ1))
σ(1− ψ1(θ1)) + (λ+ δ) [1− βF0(θ1)− (1− β)F1(θ1)]
×
{[
1− βF0(θ1)− (1− β)F1(θ1)
](1− ψ1(θ1)
q1
)n
+
σ(1− δ − σ)
λ+ δ − σλ
}
.
(58)
Note that (λ+δ−σλ)(βF0(θ
1)+(1−β)F1(θ1))
σ(1−ψ1(θ1))+(λ+δ)[1−βF0(θ1)−(1−β)F1(θ1)] > 0, 1 − βF0(θ1) − (1 −
β)F1(θ1) > 0,
σ(1−δ−σ)
λ+δ−σλ > 0 and 0 <
1−ψ1(θ1)
q1
< 1, which implies that the
conditional probability is decreasing in n. That is to say, a high-educated
worker with higher human capital is more likely to have a higher pay rate.
Specially, when n = 0, Eq.(58) can be written as
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ|1)dθ = βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1).
For the new entrants with high-educated, their pay rates are randomly drawn
from βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1). When n→∞,
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ|∞)dθ =
σ(1− δ − σ) [βF0(θ1) + (1− β)F1(θ1)]
σ(1− ψ1(θ1)) + (λ+ δ) [1− βF0(θ1))− (1− β)F1(θ1))] ,
which implies
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ|∞)dθ is non-degenerate.
Proposition 10 The probability of the high-educated workers’ equilibrium pay
rate which is less than θ1 conditional on human capital h,
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ|h)dθ, is
decreasing in h.
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4.3 Comparative analysis
We compare the effect of the low-educated workers’ tenure m on conditional
probability
∫ θ0
θ0r
G0(θ|h)dθ with the effect of the high-educated workers’ tenure
n on conditional probability
∫ θ1
θ1r
G1(θ|h)dθ. Assume that m = n = τ and
θ0 = θ1 = θ′. When τ = 0,
∫ θ′
θ0r
G0(θ|1)dθ = F0(θ′),
and ∫ θ′
θ1r
G1(θ|1)dθ = βF0(θ′) + (1− β)F1(θ′).
Since
F0(θ′) ≥ βF0(θ′) + (1− β)F1(θ′),
we can get ∫ θ′
θ0r
G0(θ|1)dθ ≥
∫ θ′
θ1r
G1(θ|1)dθ,
which indicates that for the new entrants, the high-educated workers have
relatively higher probability to enjoy a higher pay rate. As
1− ψ0(θ′)
q0
=
[1− δ − σ − βλ(1− F0(θ′))] (βλ+ δ − βλσ)
(1− δ − σ)(βλ+ δ) ,
and
1− ψ1(θ′)
q1
=
[1− δ − σ − βλ(1− F0(θ′))− (1− β)λ(1− F1(θ′))] (λ+ δ − σλ)
(1− δ − σ)(λ+ δ) ,
it is easily to get
0 <
1− ψ1(θ′)
q1
<
1− ψ0(θ′)
q0
< 1.
From (57) and (58), we can get that with the increase of tenure, the conditional
probability of the high-educated workers falls faster than that of the low-
educated workers which presents that with same tenure, the high-educated
workers are more likely to own higher pay rates.
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5 Numerical example
In this section, we perform a numerical example in a more general situation of
the model, so as to show how the profit of the firms offering the unskilled jobs
to the low-educated workers pi00, the profit of the firms offering the unskilled
jobs to the high-educated workers pi01, the total profit of the firms offering
the unskilled jobs pi0, the profit of the firms offering the skilled jobs pi1 and
the supports of the pay rate change with respect to the proportion of the
low-educated workers. Following Burdett et al (2011) who consider a year as
the reference time unit and assume workers have a 40 year expected working
lifetime, we set δ = 0.025. Following Jolivet et al. (2006) who estimates Amer-
ican turnover parameters, we set σ = 0.055 and λ = 0.15. In addition, we set
β = 0.9, so that there exists a cross-skill equilibrium.
Table 1 The effects of different proportion of the low-educated workers
α pi00 pi01 pi0 pi1 [θ
0, θ
0
] [θ1, θ
1
]
0.1 0.0250 9.1397 9.1647 10.1545 [0.3, 0.9531] [0.4690, 0.9608]
0.2 0.0999 7.2214 7.3213 9.0245 [0.3, 0.9534] [0.4691, 0.9609]
0.3 0.2247 5.5290 5.7537 7.8905 [0.3, 0.9531] [0.4695, 0.9715]
0.4 0.3994 4.0621 4.4615 6.7543 [0.3, 0.9531] [0.4702, 0.9609]
0.5 0.6241 2.8209 3.445 5.6159 [0.3, 0.9533] [0.4714, 0.9610]
0.6 0.8987 1.8054 2.7041 4.4766 [0.3, 0.9535] [0.4733, 0.9535]
0.7 1.2232 1.0155 2.2387 3.3396 [0.3, 0.9537] [0.4761, 0.9614]
0.8 1.5977 0.4513 2.049 2.2136 [0.3, 0.9540] [0.4791, 0.9616]
0.9 2.0221 0.1128 2.1349 1.1021 [0.3, 0.9542] [0.4813, 0.9618]
From Table 1, it is apparent that pi00 is increasing along with the proportion
of low-educated workers α, while pi01 is decreasing with the proportion. In the
real life, the firms offering unskilled jobs are more easily to employ the low-
educated workers and more hardly to find the high-educated workers that is
why pi00 is increasing with α, while pi01 is decreasing. In addition, pi01 is greater
than pi00 if α < 0.7 and pi00 is greater than pi01 if α ≥ 0.7 which indicate that
the profit of the firms offering the unskilled jobs to the high-educated workers
is greater than that of offering the unskilled jobs to the low-educated workers
when there are more high-educated workers as it is more easy to employ the
high-educated workers to gain more profit. Further, pi0 decreases with α if
α ≤ 80%, while pi0 increases with α if α > 80% as in this situation there are
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many low-educated workers and the profit of the firms offering the unskilled
job to the low-educated workers is very big so that the total profit of the firms
offering the unskilled job increases with the proportion of the low-educated
workers.
For the skilled jobs, the profit decreases with the increasing number of
the low-educated workers. Moreover, the profit of the firms offering the skilled
jobs is greater than that of the firms offering the unskilled jobs until there is
only very few high-educated workers. Given θ0, with the decreasing number
of the high-educated workers, θ1 decreases, while there is no distinct tendency
in θ
0
and θ
1
. That is, along with the number of the high-educated workers
decreasing, the reservation pay rate of the high-educated workers increases.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we construct and analyze an equilibrium search model in a
labor market where firms post wage-human capital contracts and risk neutral
workers search for better job opportunities whether employed or unemployed.
There are heterogeneous firms (unskilled or skilled) and workers (low-educated
or high-educated), and high-educated workers may accept unskilled jobs for
which they are over-qualified. In addition, the structure proportion of the
offered jobs affects the equilibrium, which shows there exists a threshold that
can distinguish whether the equilibrium is separating or cross-skill. The cross-
skill equilibrium solution implies the workers with higher human capital are
more likely to earn higher pay rates and the high-educated workers are more
likely to own higher pay rates than that the low-educated workers with the
same tenure are likely to.
Numerical simulations show the profit of the firms offering unskilled jobs to
low-educated workers is increasing with the proportion of low-educated work-
ers, while the profit of offering unskilled jobs to high-educated workers is de-
creasing with the proportion. Moreover, the profit of offering the unskilled jobs
to the high-educated workers is greater than the profit of the firms offering the
unskilled jobs to the low-educated workers when there are more high-educated
workers. The total profit of the firms offering the unskilled jobs decrease with
the increasing number of the low-educated workers until the great majority of
workers are low-educated worker. The profit of the firms offering skilled jobs
decreases with the increasing number of the low-educated workers. Moreover,
the profit of the firms offering the skilled jobs is greater than the profit of offer-
ing the unskilled jobs until there is only very few high-educated workers. Along
with the number of the high-educated workers decreasing, the reservation pay
rate of the high-educated workers increases. One of the most interesting con-
clusions is the growth rate of human capital is an endogenous variable which is
determined by death shock, job destruction shock, the fraction of the unskilled
jobs and the arrival rate of jobs.
This work has produced encouraging results, but further developments will
help to enhance its potential and applicability. For instance, an important
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issue is to take into account workers’ pensions. This paper only consider death
shock and job destruction shock; however, the workers are not only interesting
in current wage but also care about the pensions. Another interesting piece
of further research is to classify human capital which can be general (related
to experience) or specific (related to job tenure). These are left for future
research.
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